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 On Individual Cursedness
- How personality shapes individuals' sensitivity to
incur a winner's curse -
Nadine Chlaz
Abstract
The winner's curse is a well-known deviation from rational self-interest
in decision-making under asymmetric information. Yet, most prominent
explanations for the curse have experimentally been ruled out so far. In
particular, the curse did neither seem to emanate from a lack of experience
with a given task (Grosskopf et al. 2007), nor from the complexity of the
decision task, nor level-k thinking, nor a disability to infer information
from others' actions (Charness and Levin 2009), (Ivanov et al. 2010).
This paper elicits individuals' sensitivity to incur a winner's curse in a
common-value auction where the explanations above do not apply, tracks
down the potential source of the curse, and tests to what extent indi-
viduals' cursedness evolves (Fudenberg 2006). It nds that the curse is
tightly associated with a relatively stable individual characteristic { in-
dividuals' personality traits. Personality traits explain individuals' initial
cursedness, and also govern whether individuals unlearn, or instead, ac-
quire the curse. I review biological evidence on how personality in
uences
individuals' handling of information to explain why personality matters
here.
JEL Classication: D03,D82,D83
Key words: asymmetric information, winner's curse, personality traits
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This paper links individuals' sensitivity to incur a winner's curse to Hans-J org
Eysenck's theory of personality. Individual cursedness, as for instance, concep-
tualized by Eyster and Rabin's (2005) degree of cursedness  is such a frequent
experimental phenomenon, that it has been used to characterize so-called ' -
cursed' equilibria. By treating the winner' curse as an equilibrium phenomenon,
Eyster and Rabin (2005) organize a substantial body of experimental data. The
authors build their -cursed equilibria upon the assumption that the curse arises
because parties fail to infer the information hidden in others' actions by some
degree . Consequently, parties would fail to anticipate the selection eect un-
der information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970), and incur losses.
Thus, a cursed equilibrium relies on an individual ability to detect informa-
tion in other parties' actions. Abilities, however, can be subject to experience,
learning, and task simplication { properties which are inconsistent with the
notion of an equilibrium1 (Fudenberg 2006). Yet, the winner's curse persists
to experience and learning (Grosskopf et al. 2007), and occurs in strongly sim-
plied settings where the opponent is replaced by a simple, commonly known
decision rule (Charness and Levin 2009). Hence, the winner's curse does not
seem to vanish if the piece of information 'hidden' in an action, is extracted and
pointed out to a cursed individual. She continues to ignore this information
even when she correctly anticipates its respective payo consequences2. If one
is to understand the origin, or the exact nature of the cursedness parameter 
which organizes a lot of experimental data quite convincingly, one seemingly
needs to look out for a stable individual characteristic which persistently blinds
individuals to information put right in front of their eyes.
Here, I elicit individual degrees of cursedness and test whether they link
to Hans-J org Eysenck's three individuals' personality traits (Eysenck 1967),
1Therefore, Cranford and Iriberri (2007) provide a non-equilibrium-foundation for the win-
ner's curse via level-k thinking. If a party does not reason about the opponent, she thinks at
level zero and might not even search for information in her opponents' move.
2Individuals correctly predict the unknown state of the world for each of their actions, but
do not condition their play on these payo consequences (Charness and Levin 2009)
1
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tively stable, individual characteristics of biological origin3. Degrees of cursed-
ness are elicited in a sequential common-value auction which I design such that
all conjectured reasons for the winner's curse are ruled out. An acquirer who
holds private information moves rst, such that the potentially cursed seller does
not need to account for any future4 move in her decision-making (Charness and
Levin 2009). Furthermore, the opponent is replaced by a commonly known de-
cision rule such that thinking about the other player is not required. Thus, I
rule out belief-dependent explanations, such as level-k thinking (Crawford and
Iriberri 2007), or a strictly interpreted cursed equilibrium (Ivanov et al. 2010).
In an experiment, I elicit5 individuals' acceptance thresholds by asking which
oers they would accept, and which they would reject. The dierence between
the acceptance threshold in Bayesian Nash equilibrium and an individuals' ac-
tual acceptance threshold reveals her 'cursedness'.
I nd the curse at the typical frequency of some 22% though no opponent
need be reasoned upon, and no future move need be accounted for. However,
I am able to discriminate individuals' degrees of initial (rst-period) cursed-
ness via individuals' load on trait Extraversion, and individuals' load on trait
Psychoticism. For low loads on the latter which signals that the respective indi-
viduals have high impulse control, I do not observe cursedness at all. Personality
traits also rule which dynamics of the game unfold throughout altogether 20 pe-
riods. Extraversion triggers convergence toward fully rational play. Neuroticism
yields a dynamics toward more cursed play. I review a number of neurological,
and biological ndings which might explain these patterns.
I proceed as follows: section two presents the game, its Bayesian Nash, and
Cursed equilibria which I use as benchmark for the Curse. Section three reviews
empirical ndings on Eysencks' theory of personality. Section four presents the
experimental design. Section ve presents my results and section six concludes.
3Eysenck's personality traits correlate with specic hormones and messengers. Costa and
McCrae's (1995) Big Five are a data-driven higher factor resolution of Eysenck's concept.
4Charness and Levin (2009) conjecture that the winner's curse might occur because indi-
viduals cannot imagine how a future event can be relevant for a current decision.
5The association between winner's curse and personality carries over to other experimental
procedures, see (Chla 2010).
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2.1 Structure
The game varies the acquiring-a-company task (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983)
by assigning private information to the party who moves rst. The game in-
volves two parties, an acquirer a, and a seller s of a commodity. Both negotiate
over the seller's commodity which has quality v. This quality is a random draw
from some distribution f(v) and is private information to the acquirer. The
seller merely knows the overall distribution of qualities f(v). Both parties val-
uate the commodity dierently, acquirer a by its actual quality v, and seller s
by a fraction q of the actual quality, i.e. by qv.
Negotiation proceeds sequentially. In round T=1, acquirer a makes a pur-
chase oer p. In round T=2, seller s decides whether to accept or to reject the
oer, i.e. s 2 f0;1g. If seller s accepts oer p, she obtains oer p and yields her
commodity which she evaluates at q v. Acquirer a obtains the commodity and
pays oer p. If seller s vetoes an oer, i.e. s = 0, neither party earns anything.
The acquirer's payo hence writes a = (v   p)  s, and the seller's payo is
s = (p   q  v)  s.
Note that every oer p of a rational self-interested acquirer hides the in-
formation that it must be smaller than v, the actual quality of the commodity,
such that acquirers break even. A seller must condition her decision on accept-
ing the oer on that information if she wants to avoid losses. The two solution
concepts Bayesian Nash and Cursed Equilibrium which I apply now, dier in
their assumptions on how individuals handle this piece of information.
2.2 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In round T=2 seller s expects a nonnegative payo E(t)  0 i p  qE(vjv 




1 : p  q  E(vjv  p)
0 : otherwise
In round T=1, acquirer a rules out dominated strategies by stating the smallest
oer an acquirer accepts, i.e. p = q  E(vjv  p). She rules out losses i p  v.
3




q  E(vjv  p) : q  E(vjv  p)   v
d : otherwise
where I assume that, if she cannot make an oer a rational acquirer would
accept, she randomizes with equal probability between all oers d 2 [0;  v] where
she does not make a loss. Such oers would always be rejected in Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium.
For a uniform distribution U(0,1) of qualities v, we have E(vjv  p) =
p+1
2 .
In this case, the minimal oer a target accepts, requires 0
t = p   q  E(vjv >
p) = 0 which is satised by p0
t =
q
2 q. This oer is the equilibrium oer made
by an acquirer who does not incur a loss in making it, i.e. i p0
t   v. Note
this to be the piece of information hidden in an acquirer's move upon which a
rational seller conditions her move such as to avoid losses on expectation. Let
us now see how parties behave if they they do not fully perform that step and
play in Cursed, rather than Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Cursed Equilibria
Let me solve the game for the case of a perfectly rational robot acquirer6 who
assumes a rational seller, and a seller s who is cursed by . If so, she expects
with probability  that acquirer a does not condition her oer on her private
information v. Specically, she does not expect that any oer must be smaller
than the quality v of the commodity. If probability =1, then she is fully cursed.
In round T=2, a -cursed seller supposes to rule out losses by deciding:
;s =

1 : p    q  E(v) + (1   )  q  E(vjv  p)
0 : otherwise
A perfectly rational acquirer a who in round T=1 believes in common rational-
ity, expects seller s to comply with rational self-interest. Acquirer a makes the





q  E(vjv  p) : q  E(vjv  p)   v
d : otherwise
6This is the experimental setting. Otherwise, one would have to assume that the informa-
tionally advantaged party holds a belief about the second mover's degrees of cursedness when
making the oer.
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in equilibrium. In particular, oers d 2 [0;  v] will be accepted by a -cursed
seller s as long as d    qE(v) + (1   )  q  E(vjv  p). The condition under
which we observe trade in a -cursed equilibrium is a weighted average between
the respective trade condition in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and a fully Cursed
equilibrium where  = 1. If we assume a uniform distribution of qualities, i.e.
v  U(0;1), we have a trade condition p  qE(v) = q  0:5 for  = 1.
2.4 Personality traits and individuals' handling of infor-
mation
Cursed agents are supposed to systematically neglect information disclosed by
others' actions (Eyster and Rabin 2005). In the game at hand, buyers hold pri-
vate information on nature's move which determines the quality  v of a seller's
commodity. A rational buyer's oer will be such that she does not incur a loss
and every oer made by such a buyer will reveal a lower bound of quality  v,
namely p0
t   v. A seller needs to identify this information in a buyer's oer.
If understood as an ability, an individual's performance in detecting this piece
of information might be subject to experience, learning, and change and would
not be suited to dene an equilibrium (Fudenberg 2006).
In sequential common value auctions however, the phenomenon survives
learning and experience (Grosskopf et al. 2007), and persists under strongly
facilitated inferability (Charness and Levin 2009)7. Individuals are actually
found to collect accurate information (i.e. rank qualities accurately conditional
on dierent oers in the buy-in case), but are either unaware of the information
they have gathered, or do not see why or how to respond to such information
(Charness and Levin 2009). If cursedness can be stable in such a setting, then
either it does not re
ect an ability, or it re
ects an ability which cannot be ac-
quired. If it persists under strong simplication, cursedness cannot re
ect mere
intelligence. Instead, we require some other individual specicity.
One such specicity which shapes an individual's handling of information
7Therein, the buy-out case in an acquiring-a-company game is tested for two types of
quality only. There is no future opponent's move to be reasoned upon which is why level-k
thinking would not apply.
5
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sonality (Eysenck 1967, 1990) and their impact on an individuals' handling of
information. Eysenck's concept P-E-N is substantiated by both theory and em-
piricism. It has a biological foundation which vouches for its stability.
Neuroticism as opposed to emotional stability describes a rst dimension.
Load on neuroticism re
ects a heightened degree of emotionality and a propen-
sity to experience negative emotions (Busato et al. 2000). Typical symptoms
for a high load on neuroticism count anxiety, nervosity, and low stress tolerance
(Eysenck and Eysenck 1975). It inhibits an individual's adaptability to envi-
ronmental change (Hennig et al. 1998) and may fully intercept the link between
intelligence and task performance (Mouta et al. 2006). In summary, Neuroti-
cism impacts the overall activity of the aective system. Thereby, it may inhibit
the deliberate rational system (Fudenberg and Levine 2006) and thus aect the
rational assessment of information.
Extraversion as opposed to intraversion denes how one interacts with one's
environment. Typical symptoms for a high load on extraversion are activeness,
conviviality, assertiveness, or the seeking for sensations. Extraverts exhibit low
cortical arousal thresholds and therefore require intense external stimulation.
They are highly sensitive to potential rewards (Depue and Collins 1999), spend
little time on stimulus analysis, and respond to stimulus even when unnecessary
(Brebner and Flavel 1978). Extraverts derive cortical arousal from preparing
reactions to stimulus while introverts derive cortical arousal from the analysis of
stimulus itself (Rammsayer and Stahl 2004)8. In sum, extraversion may predis-
pose an agent to respond, but indispose her to properly prepare that response
by a careful assessment or inference of information.
Psychoticism as opposed to high impulse control measures alleviated at-
tributes of schizophrenia in healthy individuals. Typical symptoms count agres-
siveness, egocentrism, antisociality, low empathy, impulsiveness, nonconformity,
and creativity (Eysenck et al. 1985). Psychoticism goes along with high dopamine
levels (Colzato et al. 2009) and manifests in low conditionability (Lester 1989).
Load on psychoticism may inhibit an agent to condition her behaviour ade-
quately on the information she receives. However, psychoticism seems a con-
troversial dimension of personality. Some studies nd it a reliable (Ortet et al.
1999), some an unreliable (Caruso et al. 2001) scale.
8This relation was conjectured by Eysenck, but could only be identied empirically by
Rammsayer and Stahl's (2004) design
6
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I ran a computerized experiment of three sessions with altogether 96 partici-
pants9. The Common value parameter q which rules the extent of the potential
winner's curse10 under information asymmetry was set to q = 0:6. Qualities
were drawn from a uniform distribution f(v) = U(0;10) with a cognitively sim-
plied [0,10]-interval of qualities11.
In the beginning of each session, subjects completed the standardized Ger-
man Eysenck personality inventory 'EPQ-R' developed by Ruch (1999). It elic-
its Eysenck's personality dimensions Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoti-
cism. Then, subjects started out with an elicitation of subjects' risk preferences
where subjects would chose between lotteries and sure payos12. Thus, sub-
jects started out with an endowment of €5 plus expected €2.50. Feedback on
the risk preferences was only given in the end of the experiment such that all
participants started with an equal expected endowment. This endowment was
intended to compensate the negative payos of cursed participants from the
game13. Subsequently, subjects played the game presented in section two for
twenty rounds. The buyer was replaced by a preprogrammed robot whose de-
cision rule was commonly known, and who played the Bayesian Nash acquirer
strategy derived in section 2.2. This amounted to overall 96 independent series
of 20 seller choices. In each round, my main interest was in subjects' degree
of cursedness and therefore, in the smallest oer a subject would still accept.
To identify that oer, I divided the range of oers into ve equally sized steps,
and asked subjects to decide at which oer they would switch from accept to
reject. (strategy method). Afterwards, the step between the last oer a subject
was still willing to accept and the rst oer she did not accept anymore was
redivided twice into ve equally sized steps. Thus, the last oer they were still
9Undergraduates from the Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena, randomly drawn from dif-
ferent elds of study. Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004), the experiment
was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
10Or the corresponding social dilemma if one assumes full rationality of either party.
11Values between 0 and 1 result in very small numbers for seller valuations and oers, and
hence, very small absolute dierences.
12Risk preferences were elicited in the beginning to generate some initial payo. The per-
sonality questionnaire is rather lengthy, and was administered in the end.
13The amount of €7.50 equals the show-up fee that participants receive in experiments
where a winner's curse usually occurs.
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decimals. Subjects' degree of cursedness  would unfold as the dierence in
subjects' actual break even point and subjects' acceptance threshold. Feedback
was given on the payos for each round, but not on overall earnings. Thus,
subjects had an opportunity to learn in an environment where the only element
of the utility function which varied was nature's random draw. If subjects got
more aware of the information described in the decision rule, the winner's curse
would disappear with the experience of twenty rounds.
Throughout each task, subjects proceeded at their own speed. Neither did
they need to wait for others' decisions to be made nor were they pressed to make
their own decisions by others' decisions having been made14. Average earnings
were 7.40 €, and the experiment last approximately an hour.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptives
Do individuals who dier in their load on Eysenck's personality traits exhibit
visibly dierent degrees of cursedness? If so, individuals with a high load on a
given trait and individuals with a low load on the same trait should state visibly
dierent acceptance thresholds.
Extraversion. Figure 1 depicts violin plots (Hintze et al. 1998) of indi-
viduals' acceptance thresholds given high15 (Extraverts), and given low load
(Intraverts) on Extraversion for all periods, the rst period only, early, and
late periods. Violin plots show the distribution of acceptance thresholds (grey
shaded area), which is centered around the interquartile range (black line) with
the median (white point). Two dotted lines depict the interval between a fully
cursed equilibrium where the degree of cursedness is  = 1, and a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium where  = 0. Overall, Intraverts and Extraverts dier little
in their acceptance thresholds, except that Intraverts state more often higher-
than-Nash equilibrium thresholds than Extraverts do. Visible dierence occur
at the outset. In period 1, only some 25% of all Intraverts fall within  2 [0;1]
and classify as cursed with residual 50% of Intraverts who state higher-than
Nash-thresholds. In contrast, 50% of all Extraverts classify as cursed.
8
























































































Figure 1: Violin plots for high and low loads on Extraversion (median
split).
In the early periods, Intraverts' acceptance thresholds become substantially
more cursed. Extraverts' thresholds decrease in the lower quartile, but are less
aected by rst experience. In the last ve periods, Extraverts' and Intraverts'
do not dier much within the interval of cursedness. However, we see that the
lower tail of Extraverts' thresholds is visibly fatter than for Intraverts. Through-
out all cases, some 25% of all thresholds fall outside the interval  2 [0;1].
Extraverts have higher overall prots than Intraverts do, because their thresh-
olds increase more quickly after the fth round than those of Intraverts do (see
section 5.2).
Neuroticism. Violin plots in Figure 2 depict acceptance thresholds given
high and low load on Neuroticism. Overall, emotionally stable Nonneurotics,
and Neurotics show little dierence in their acceptance thresholds. However,
Neurotics' acceptance thresholds seem to have a fatter left tail than Nonneu-
rotics' who have more often a tresholds below a fully cursed equilibrium. At
the outset, only 25% of emotionally stable individuals classify as (moderately)
cursed with a median at  = 0. Neurotics are more cursed in the median
threshold, and cover the entire range of cursedness. In the early rounds, ex-
perience increases the curse for either load, and in the nal rounds, only the
14Note that this is important to see uncensored dierences between introverts and extraverts
15'high' indicates a load higher than the median load over all participants, and 'low' a load
smaller than the median load.
9























































































Figure 2: Violin plots for high and low loads on Neuroticism (median
split).
lower tails of the distributions continue to dier. The fat left tail of Neurotics'
acceptance thresholds indicates frequent heavily cursed thresholds. A substan-
tial part of Neurotics' acceptance thresholds falls below a fully cursed threshold.
This pattern makes that earnings dier only in the 25% quantiles: highly neu-
rotic individuals incur the heaviest losses.
Psychoticism. Figure 3 depicts acceptance thresholds given high and low
load on Psychoticism. Overall, individuals with a high impulse control who
have a low load on Psychoticism, and individuals with a high load on Psychoti-
cism dier little in their acceptance thresholds. At the outset, 25% of non-
psychotic individuals fall within the range a cursedness  2 [0;1] whereas 50%
of individuals with a high load classify as   cursed. However, nonpsychotic
individuals become visibly cursed in the rst rounds whereas the 75% quantile
of Psychotists' acceptance thresholds starts to cross the Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium line. In the last ve rounds, som 50% of all individuals with a low load
on Psychoticism still classify as cursed whereas Psychotics' thresholds continue
to increase and for the last ve rounds, only 25% still classify as (moderately)
cursed. Overall earnings re
ect these dynamics in that individuals with a low
load earn less than individuals with a high load.
10




























































































Here, I quantify to what extent the 'natural treatments' load on Neuroticism,
load on Extraversion, and load on Psychoticism explain individuals' acceptance
thresholds at the outset. Table 1 depicts OLS results of a linear regression
where the dependent variable are individuals' acceptance thresholds, and the
independent variables are individuals' personality traits, and their risk attitude.
Residuals would neither correlate with the tted values from the regression, nor
with single regressors, and hence, there is no latent variable which drives the
results in question. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust, and the R2
was 0.17.
Estimate Std. Error t-Value p-Value
Intercept 8.74 1.19 7.35 0.01
Ex -2.47 0.82 -3.02 0.01
P -2.78 1.26 -2.21 0.03
N -0.59 0.84 -0.71 0.48
R -3.72 1.50 -2.48 0.02
Table 1: Acceptance thresholds, rst period.
11
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in the rst round as indicated by the size of the intercept. There are two per-
sonality traits, Extraversion Ex, and Psychoticism P which signicantly relate
to acceptance thresholds in the rst period. The higher the load on the respec-
tive trait, the lower the acceptance threshold. Risk attitudes also play a role in
the rst period. The more risk averse an individual, the lower the acceptance
threshold in the rst period. Note that there are two types of risks in this game:
the risk of making a loss; but also the risk of rejecting a potentially benecial
oer, and to earn Zero. The negative coecient makes sense for the latter,
in particular if one considers the size of the intercept. Altogether, to reach
the interval of cursedness which is pmin:=1 2 [3;4:29[, a risk-neutral individual
would need to have some 50%16 load on Extaversion, and Psychoticism, or load
extremely high on one of these traits.
To shed some light on the heterogeneity of these eects, I repeated the re-
gression above for various quantiles of individuals' overall acceptance thresholds
in period One17. Fig. 4 depicts the impact of each personality trait for various
quantiles of acceptance thresholds pmin :  = 1.























































































































































Each graph in Fig. 4 shows, to what extent an increasing load on a specic trait
16This means that 50% of the circumstances elicited in the P-E-N-L questionnaires which
load on the respective scale apply.
17Hence, for each quantile of pmin :  = 1, the regression equation is :
pmin:=1;;i = 0 + 1Ex + 2N + 3P + 4R + ui
12
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Two dotted vertical lines delimit the interval of -cursed acceptance thresholds.
The lower (leftward) boundary marks a fully cursed acceptance threshold, i.e.
 = 1, the upper (rightward) boundary marks a Bayesian Nash acceptance
threshold, i.e.  = 0. The shaded region consists of 99% condence intervals
for the eect/coecient of a personality trait on the respective quantiles18. Ex-
traversion does not show a signicant impact on threshold quantiles which signal
high cursedness. The impact turns signicant halfway from a fully Cursed to a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Hence, individuals with a higher load on Extraver-
sion are more often more cursed initially, but not beyond a certain intermediate
level of cursedness. Outside the range of cursedness, individuals with a higher
load on Extraversion less often make inecient above-equilibrium thresholds
(pmin :  = 1 > 4:29) in the rst period.
Neuroticism does not show a signicant impact on any quantile, and hence,
the non-existence of an eect on the mean in table 1 is homogeneous, i.e. holds
for the entire distribution of acceptance thresholds. Psychoticism aects the
entire range of -cursed acceptance thresholds. The higher the individual load
on Psychoticism, the more cursed the individual acceptance threshold over all
. Similarly to Extraversion, an increasing individual load on Psychoticism
makes inecient acceptance thresholds above the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
less likely. In summary, the eects on the mean acceptance threshold observed
in table 1 turn out to be quite homogeneous for the entire distribution of accep-
tance thresholds. In particular, the eects exist within the range of cursedness
.
5.2 Dynamics
Now, I analyze to what extent load on Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Psychoti-
cism aect the evolution of individuals' acceptance thresholds with experience.
Table 2 depicts OLS results of a linear xed eects regression. The dependent
variable are individuals' acceptance thresholds, and the independent variables
18Whenever this shaded region does not include Zero, i.e. does not include the x-axis, the
coecient/impact of the respective personality trait on the respective quantile is signicant
at p  0:01
13
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uals would not correlate with tted values from the regression, or with single
regressors, to avoid any spurious relation. Standard errors are heteroscedastic-
ity robust, and the R2 was 0.87. Individual intercepts (xed eects) are not
displayed.
Estimate Std. Error t-Value p-Value
Ex  Period 0.04 0.01 3.27 0.01
N  Period -0.04 0.02 -2.21 0.03
Table 2: Acceptance thresholds, all periods.
There were no signicant interactions of risk attitudes, or Psychoticism with
experience (periods). The only two personality traits which turned out to aect
individuals' potential (un)learning of the curse, were load on Extraversion, and
load on Neuroticism. Thereby, extraversion would increase the mean accep-
tance threshold with experience, and hence, extraverts would unlearn the curse.
Load on Neuroticism which was not found to aect the mean, or any quantile
of individuals' acceptance thresholds in the rst period, turns out to decrease
the mean acceptance threshold throughout periods. By how much can accep-
tance thresholds hence dier in the experiment? Loads on personality traits fall
within [0,1], period counts from 1 to 20, and hence, Extraversion would increase
the predicted acceptance threshold by 0.04 from one round to another, or, by
0.8 over the entire experiment. For Neuroticism, we have a similar sized eect,
but it is negative. Hence, over the entire experiment, an individual with a fully
cursed threshold, i.e.  = 1 at the outset, could state a less severely cursed
threshold in the end, i.e.  = 0:3819.
Fig. 5 repeats this regression for various quantiles of acceptance thresholds.
Each graphs in Fig. 5 shows, how much a respective predictor changes a given
quantile of acceptance thresholds. As before, two dotted vertical lines delimit
the interval of - cursed acceptance thresholds, and the shaded region depicts
19Bayesian Nash threshold is pBNE
min :  = 1 = 4:29, fully cursed threshold is pBNE
min :  =
1 = 3, the degree of cursedness if the fully cursed acceptance threshold of 3 rises to 3.8, is
1   (0:8=(4:29   3)) = 0:38
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99% condence intervals for the eect of a predictor on the respective quan-
tile. The interaction of Extraversion with Period signicantly increases nearly
all quantiles of acceptance thresholds, and in particular, the range of -cursed
acceptance thresholds. Hence, Extraverts seem to homogeneously unlearn the
curse. The size of the eect diers, however: unlearning is the stronger, the
lower the initial acceptance threshold (the smaller the quantile of the distribu-
tion). The interaction of Neuroticism with Period nearly always reduces the
respective quantile of acceptance threholds. It is a little more heterogeneous
in signicance. However, we nd that Neuroticism signicantly lowers initially
cursed acceptance thresholds (the coecient turns highly signicant halfway
from a fully Cursed, to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Hence, those individuals
who initially incur losses, will incur more losses throughout rounds. In partic-
ular, Neuroticism unfolds the fatal dynamics that also individuals who would
not classify as cursed in the beginning, will lower their acceptance thresholds
with time, and therefore, will move toward, and into the interval of - cursed
acceptance thresholds.
6 Conclusion
This paper nds a strong association between individuals' sensitivity to expe-
rience a winner's curse, or individuals' cursedness, and Hans-J org Eysenck's
theory of personality. Cursedness is such a stable phenomenon, that it has been
15
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solution concept for games of imperfect information. Therein,  is intended
to describe in how far individuals infer information from others' actions about
others' private information. Yet, to characterize an equilibrium, the source of
the curse must be stable, a property which is not likely to be fullled if the
curse arises from an (in)ability which can evolve (Fudenberg 2006). While pre-
vious experimental studies arm, however, that the curse persists to experience
(Grosskopf et al. 2007) and cognitive simplication, these studies also nd that
teh curse exists when there is no other player to be reasoned upon (Charness
and Levin 2009). Hence, while a curse might show equilibrium-like stability, it
does not seem to emanate from individuals' beliefs. Hence, Eyster and Rabin's
assumption is wrong. Instead, Charness and Levin suggest that individuals
might fail to see how a future event per se can be relevant for a current decision.
Here, I adapt the acquiring-a-company task (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983)
to the case of an expert buyer who holds private information on the value of
a commodity and makes an acquisition oer to a seller who ignores the exact
quality of her commodity. Hence, the potentially cursed party moves last, and
needs to account for a past, rather than a future move. In an experimental test,
the acquirer's move is replaced by a commonly known decision rule (Charness
and Levin 2009) such as to abstract from level-k thinking (Crawford and Iriberri
2007). I nd that the curse persists, and conclude that it is not the futurity of
the event to be taken into account which drives the curse.
Instead, individuals' propensity to experience a winner's curse strongly de-
pends on their personality traits. Using the framework of Hans-J org Eysencks
P-E-N20 which describes three fundamental personality traits { Psychoticism,
Extraversion, and Neuroticism { , initial (rst-period-) cursedness links to high
loads on Extraversion, and by a somewhat less signicant but equally sized ex-
tent, to Psychoticism. Extraverts are active, convivial individuals who derive
extensive cortical arousal from preparing reactions to stimulus. Their proneness
to an initial winner's curse might result from quick decisions after only a short
20It is the parent version of Costa and McCraes Big Five. The latter does not rely on
Eysenck's theory, and most biological ndings on individuals' handling of information have
been established with P-E-N
16
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and impulsiveness. Psychotists' initial winner's curse could be a result of im-
pulsiveness. Neuroticism is not able to explain any part of the initial winner's
curse.
Eysenck's P-E-N also explains how individuals (un)learn the curse. While
extraverts have a propensity to experience an initial winner's curse, they quickly
unlearn it with experience. This might result from extraverts being individuals
who are highly sensitive and reactive to feedback. High load on Neuroticism in
turn seems to trigger a reverse dynamic. Neurotic individuals do not show an
initial winner's curse, but acquire the curse with experience. Neurotics are emo-
tional individuals with a high propensity to experience negative emotions and
low stress tolerance. Hence, for some individuals, the winner's curse emerges
with experience, a possibility which has theoretically been explored in (Mietti-
nen 2009).
My results point out, rst, that an individual's curse links to stable charac-
teristics of that individual, i.e. her personality traits, which are distinct from
mere intelligence. This sheds light on why individuals persistently fail to ac-
count even for correct information on the selection eect under information
asymmetry (Charness and Levin 2009). Second, personality traits govern how
the curse evolves with experience. The persistence of the phenomenon seems
to merely exist at the aggregate level: initially cursed Extraverts unlearn the
curse, whereas initially uncursed Neurotics acquire the curse { overall, the share
of cursed agents remains the same. It is questionable whether Extraverts start
to see more of the information contained in the decision rule which generates
the oer, or whether they simply react sucessfully to feedback without knowing
why they initially made losses. However, feedback on prots in stochastic envi-
ronments is usually not that easy to interpret - a Nash equilibrium bid prevents
losses on average, but not in every interaction. My results provide, third, a
concept which explains behaviour under information asymmetry which was pre-
viously left unexplained, namely bidding outside the interval of expected quality,
and the quality conditional on another party's move. Overall, I conclude that
individuals' predisposition to incur a winner's curse is found in their personality
traits, and that Eyster and Rabin's  is a one-dimensional representation of the
latter.
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